The death statistics (“before” and “after”) are very much in, regarding New Jersey’s “Stop and Stay Stopped” crosswalk law. I have been documenting, describing, and informing our politicians, safety officials, and major news publications about the (very much “new”) dangers that came along with this law, for twelve years now. Prior to continuing, all should read “The ‘Stop and Stay Stopped’ Crosswalk Law Has Created Many New Dangers!”. This is the oldest archived essay at http://www.edmundmiller.wordpress.com
New Jersey’s “Stop and Stay Stopped” crosswalk law was enacted mid-2010. It assumes that crosswalks (nearly 90 degrees out of line with a driver’s visual plane, and not literally a physical barrier) can offer some sort of magical protection to pedestrians – instead of simply reminding them where the safest crossing locations are (usually an unambiguous traffic light or stop sign). With the new (logistically impossible to navigate) scenarios and equally dangerous assumptions created by this law (and legal requirement), this fantasy exists at the pedestrian’s expense. In fact, this law also violates our three best known “rules of the road” (again – read the essay!). Put another way, this law has very directly, and very visibly, affected the actions and expectations of every (conscious) driver and pedestrian out there in our state – to one extent or another.
What this left us with, is the lack of any (unaffected) segment of the population that might be considered a “control” in this experiment. Have no fear though! In the absence of any (similarly timed) changes to our environment that could possibly claim to have had this same level of global influence, we are actually presented with a very good (time-based) “control” as we perform a before/after comparison. In doing so, we are also able to compare the pedestrian death trend to that of all other road fatalities. And, with the participation of essentially every driver and pedestrian in our state, our sample size and statistical accuracy should be pretty good.
In performing my analysis, I referred specifically (and only) to the “TEN YEAR EXPERIENCE” charts contained within the “Fatal Motor Vehicle Crash Reports” published by the New Jersey State Police. Their report dated 2010 is where the 2001-2010 chart is found. This decade was then compared to the 2011-2020 chart, available in the report for year 2020. The state made one arithmetic error (year 2004 shows “723” where they likely meant “732”), but I considered this insignificant.
My aim, as much as possible, was to avoid the introduction of “subjectivity” into this analysis. The column categories in these charts are broad – which is good. In contrast, the idea of breaking these fatalities down further (perhaps by “age”, “sex”, or “what color shirt the driver was wearing”) would be selective in nature – as these would not represent the endless other ways this same data could have (also) been broken down. Additional breakdowns also present additional risks in terms of their potential use as fodder for misrepresentation and manipulation. I did take one liberty, however, in that I grouped all of the non-pedestrian deaths into a single entity for the purpose of comparison. For this “all other fatalities” grouping I added together the totals in columns “Drivers”, “Passengers” and “Pedalcyclists”. “Motorcycles” and “Mopeds” were not included, as the state already included these deaths in the first two columns – depending on whether the deceased was a “driver” or “passenger”.
As to any possible loss of nuance resulting from my “all other fatalities” grouping, I add the following: Total “Pedalcyclists” deaths remained essentially the same. This also means that they did not experience the same dramatic decreases seen among most motorized vehicles (perhaps in line with my additional warnings about newly installed “dangerous bike lane” designs). Their inclusion here, however, works only to my mathematical and rhetorical disadvantage when it comes to calculating the percentage-based results for pedestrian deaths. In the case of “Motorcycles”, these deaths decreased slightly, but also not nearly as much as for other vehicles. Additional analysis would be needed for a fuller picture regarding any nuance lost by their inclusion in my grouping. And finally, “Mopeds” fatalities went from “2” to “8”. This might be meaningful and dramatic in isolation, but I’m not presently looking into this, and these numbers would have little impact on my pedestrian-related calculations either way. Translation: The nuance lost by grouping “all other fatalities” together may have slightly altered the math, but this is unlikely to have exaggerated the results (in my favor) to any meaningful degree.
(Consult the “TEN YEAR EXPERIENCE” charts while reading the following)
BY THE NUMBERS:
In comparing New Jersey road fatality totals for the decade prior to implementation of New Jersey’s “Stop and Stay Stopped” crosswalk law (2001-2010), to the decade after (2011-2020), my original warning (that pedestrian deaths would increase disproportionately) proved true in the numbers. Prior to the law, New Jersey saw 1,501 pedestrian deaths. This increased to 1,657 in the decade after. As alluded to previously, “all other fatalities” headed in the opposite direction – going from 5,441 to only 4,151. This means we saw 156 additional “pedestrian” deaths (a 10.4% INCREASE) at the same time we saw 1,290 fewer deaths among “all other fatalities” (a 23.7% DECREASE)! In terms of their “percentage of total deaths”, pedestrian deaths went from a decade-based average of 21.5% prior to the law, to 28.5% after (see the year-based chart at end). Also interesting, if a person was to assume that some level of mitigation must have occurred as a result of New Jersey’s mass installation (over time) of those large yellow “crosswalk here” signs – themselves an unspoken acknowledgement of my “nearly 90 degrees out of line with a driver’s visual plane” observation – these results would have to be considered even more worrisome.
My additional warning (that “because the new logistical impossibilities and confusion it creates are inherent to ‘Stop and Stay Stopped’ these dangers will actually increase as drivers and pedestrians try harder and harder to conform to the law”) was also supported in the results. The “learning curve” improvements some of my critics expected, never actually materialized in the numbers. Quite the opposite in fact. The highest “four consecutive year” pedestrian death totals occurred in years 2017-2020 – again, not in alignment with “all other fatalities”.
And finally, in regards to any potential claim that these deaths may have somehow been the unfortunate byproduct of changes that nevertheless improved safety “overall” – this is not supported by the numbers. The highest “seven consecutive year” death numbers (for all fatalities) occurred in years 2001-2007 with a dramatic drop in 2008 (two years prior to “Stop and Stay Stopped”). These then remained lower, and fairly constant, through 2020. At the same time, there was no associated increase in pedestrian deaths (2008-2010), and the high pedestrian deaths in later years also display no correlation. There is nothing in these numbers to support such a notion.
For the purpose of full disclosure – I actually did identify an additional category of loosely correlated “change” that occurred (over time) in our state in recent years. I’m referring to the installation of a large array of poorly conceived, and equally untested physical road designs that may also have disproportionately endangered pedestrians. Perhaps a lesser “codefendant” in all this? Those looking for a good laugh – followed by a good cry – should check out these details and photos in “Will These Faulty Road Designs and ‘Safety Improvements’ Proliferate Unchecked Under New Federal Infrastructure Funding?” (about 25 essays back, on the same site mentioned above).
My final comment about the numbers, is that they weren’t needed in the first place! Although these (very much “new”) dangers are numerous, and their step-by-step details extensive – the information I provided was nevertheless easy to understand. The dangers were also “self-evident” – in the same way we wouldn’t need to run an experiment to prove that toddlers playing in the middle of an intersection is dangerous. And, considering the extent of the influence they now have on street crossings, there was (and continues to be) no rationale for ignoring these new dangers – regardless of a person’s hopes for “Stop and Stay Stopped”.
THE DANGER CONTINUES:
- There is literally no process in place by which a citizen can report a clear and present danger – such as a dangerous road design (or law in this case)- and be assured that this issue will be routed to the correct jurisdiction (federal, state, county, municipal), where the danger will be properly addressed (short term), and the “lessons learned” then documented and shared globally.
- At the low end of any logical assessment, we can reasonably conclude that at least 156 additional pedestrians were killed in New Jersey (between 2011-2020) as a direct consequence of the “Stop and Stay Stopped” crosswalk law. Our overall concern, however, should be increased by the number of states having similar laws.
- Because these additional pedestrian deaths are now part of the new “norm” – the time-based correlation between “Stop and Stay Stopped” and these additional deaths will not be visible going forward. The deaths will continue, but no “cause and effect” alarm bell will ring as these (already bad) numbers are themselves used for reference in future comparisons.
- Though this law remains an ongoing danger, it is also one of the most “actionable” items – should politicians and safety officials decide to put it back on their plates. Unfortunately, remediating these new dangers will be much more difficult than it would have been to avoid them in the first place. The proper retraining of driver/pedestrian behaviors and expectations would require great finesse, along with a properly considered and widespread educational campaign, in order to avoid further adding to our overall level of danger. From my experience, there does not appear to be the proper skills, or organizational structures in place for this at present. The “zero deaths” mantra sounds even sillier when coming from those who refuse to look inward.
- New Jersey’s Department of Transportation continues to provide us with evidence of breaks in their process. The NJDOT is now sending drivers cutesy text messages, which can only be read while driving – down the “highway” no less! The debate over the dangers of these digital (safety related) road signs is not much of a debate when considering those that appear in two stages. After sparking our curiosity and bypassing our concerns for safety, we maintain a prolonged focus on the sign, for fear we might miss the (second stage) “punch line” when it finally appears! This is complete idiocy! An online article by NJ 101.5 stated there’s no formal process behind this campaign, and NJDOT spokesman Steve Shapiro was quoted as saying that decisions about what to actually display are arrived at through “brainstorming”. Other examples of failed oversight include the proliferation of logistically impossible, and even “contra-legal” road markings installed by the state on roads they maintain (yet another recent essay).
FINAL THOUGHT:
It’s certainly true that “correlation” does not always equal “causation”. However, it’s also true that “correlation” is the biggest clue in science. The answer to any mystery or scientific question will always contain correlated details. Though officials often claimed to have an idea as to what was going on with these rising pedestrian deaths, they typically also failed to mention the massively influential “Stop and Stay Stopped” crosswalk law that they had pushed for, and which came into existence at the same time. I also haven’t seen the presentation of any “step-by-step” details in relation to their theories, or of corroborating specificity within the numbers themselves. Hopefully in my analysis above, I’ve provided (and pointed to) both.
edmundmiller 